Parliamentary Diplomacy and the North-South Dialogue by Lateef, Noel
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
VOLUME 11 1981 ISSUE 1
PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY AND THE
NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE
Noel Lateef*
I. INTRODUCTION: DELIMITATION OF THE PROBLEM
The search for a right answer to a question of law is rarely
relegated to theory in a mature legal system. Legal reasoning
should and usually does eventuate in practice. Diplomacy, as a
kind of problem-solving, enjoys no such assurance. Revisionist ac-
tors in the North-South dialogue avoid the fact that world order is
achieved without the intervention of an omniscient global-
ordering device (GOD), ie., a monolithic body or hodgepodge of in-
ternational organizations with a "roving jurisdiction to do good."
In a world replete with diverse passions and interests, which can-
not be exorcised by even the most interventionist GOD,' the
cogwheels of the international system catch as states pursue
primarily national objectives. What order is achieved is the pro-
duct of interaction among states. Hence, the rational conduct of in-
ternational relations requires procedural sophistication: revi-
sionist actors must not overtax diplomatic infrastructure and ex-
pect fruitful outcomes; status quo actors would do well to ap-
preciate the importance of flexibility without overlooking the
observation of Justice Holmes that "the substance of the law is
secreted in the interstices of procedures."'
*The author served in the State Department (1977-78) on the staff of Ambassador Jean
Wilkowski, United States Coordinator for the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology
for Development. He is presently at the Yale Law School researching the interaction of law
and development. The assistance of Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman, and Eugene
V. Rostow is gratefully acknowledged.
I Alexander Hamilton observed: "Though nations in the main are governed by what they
suppose their interest, he must be imperfectly versed in human nature who ... does not
know that [kind or unkind] dispositions may insensibly mould or bias the views of self-
interest." Quoted in G. STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT 92 (1970).
Quoted in G. BALL. DIPLOMACY FOR A CROWDED WORLD 193 (1976). Procedures regulating
statist interactions are critically important. The international system would be unraveled
routinely without common adherence to adjective law, independent of the platforms ad-
vocated by revisionist actors seeking substantive due process on a global scale. It is argued
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A. Dirigiste v. Interactive Models
Generalizing from their domestic orders, many member states
of the Group of 773 (G-77) approach international life transfixed in
a dirigiste, or directive, model. The single most distinctive
characteristic of the dirigiste model is the emphasis it places on
central guidance, to the neglect of interactions.' Politics in this
model becomes the "administration of things."5 The political
system, ie., the administrative organization, is geared to making
decisions on the basis of elite conceptions of the "correct" answers.
The dominant value expounded in the interactive model- a value
notable for its role in both the development of market theory and
liberal political theory- is that of decentralized decisionmaking by
individuals or firms expressing their desires and seeking to maxi-
mize their welfare as they perceive it. Economic decisionmaking is
dispersed to the greatest possible degree. The mechanism of checks
and balances is particularly prized, preventing action by any one
authority until widely sanctioned. Certain key interaction patterns
are valued as though ends in themselves. Such patterns permeate
the interactive legal system, tending to tip the scales in favor of
form over substance. Consequently, in the hierarchy of judicial ob-
jectives, a fair trial will be superordinated to the fact of guilt or in-
in the present essay that governments cannot afford to factor out diplomatic procedures
from the policymaking process in foreign affairs. The availability of promising procedures
and the political and legal opportunity and transactions costs they entail must be con-
sidered integral to the policy decision itself. Thus, a systematic framework for viewing the
interaction between substance and procedure is desirable.
' The 112 or so developing countries until recently were usually lumped together as
"Third World", although this appellation is no longer in vogue. With the great riches accru-
ing to oil-producing countries, plus a "middle class" of rapidly growing economies, some
observers now distinguish a "Fourth World" subgroup consisting of the poorest nations.
Some use-the term "Fourth World" for nations on the verge of economic take-off and "Fifth
World" for the very poorest. "The Group of 77" is still used to designate the entire group-
ing when they take common positions in such fora as the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
' Policy is usually incremental. It "is made" by moving from package deal to package deal
without, to the detriment of the outcome, much thought for an overall scheme or a total
design that takes into account immediate crises, intermediate trends, and long-range prob-
able developments. This is not to refute the desirability of a contextual approach. Harold
Lasswell has written: "Unless tentative value judgments are reviewed in the context of a
total conception of the preferred form of social order, unncessary inconsistencies and omis-
sions occur." Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment. Principles of Context and Procedure, 1
INQUIRY 87 (1958).
1 Samuel P. Huntington states: "Men are ... reluctant to give up the image of social har-
mony without political action. This was Rousseau's dream. It remains the dream of
stateman and soldier who imagine that they can induce community in their societies
without engaging in the labor of politics." S. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES 10 (1968).
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nocence. The interactive model favors policymaking structures
which are sensitive to pluralist ideals in ensuring that all parties to a
controversy have a role in its resolution. But the right to be heard is
not a guarantee that one will be listened to, and, again, substance
may be the casualty of form. Nonetheless, fair procedures ensure
the integrity of democracy defined, in the apt phrase of Lord
Bryce, as "government by public opinion."' In contrast, pro-
cedures are nonessential in the dirigiste model.' Yet, were it not
for the procedural framework sanctioned in the interactive model,
there would be no North-South dialogue in the first place.
Sweeping programs such as the New International Economic
Order (NIEO) and the New International Legal Order (NILO) are
the inevitable products of a dirigiste approach to world ordering.
These seemingly synoptic plans slough over the crucial role of inter-
actions in world politics;8 their proponents appear more concerned
with ends than means.9 This posture undermines parliamentary
diplomacy,0 which, in the past, provided evidence of the possibili-
' See J. BRYCE, 2 THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 259-66 (1904).
' Modern-day China, with a population of 800,000,000, has a mere 3,500 lawyers. See V.
Li. LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS 10 (1978).
' The present international climate is reminiscent of the accusations bandied about after
the beginning of World War I, condemning the diplomacy of the Old World for failing to
prevent the outbreak of war and for hastening its arrival. Similarly, revisionist actors
predict dire consequences if reforms in world politics are not instituted forthwith.
After the war, President Woodrow Wilson publicly espoused the replacement of the
secret, undemocratic, and bankrupt diplomacy of Europe by open negotiations and
democratic control of foreign relations in the American pattern. "Wilsonian diplomacy" also
came to mean popular debate of foreign policy and the replacement of power politics by
global collective security functioning under "parliamentary" procedures. Although many of
these lofty objectives were never realized, they nonetheless entered the corpus of nor-
mative aspirations of international law. The revisionists point to a number of contemporary
developments giving rise to a new diplomacy, which they contend is no less revolutionary
than the Wilsonian attempt. Although the new diplomacy purports to be democratic, it is
sadly deficient in this respect. The emergence of a dirigiste diplomacy has been one of the
chief factors contributing to the present crisis in multipartite fora, such as those of the
United Nations.
' The G-77 flouts McClelland's key finding that "[tihe achievement sequence more often
dwells on obstacles to success and specific means of overcoming them, rather than on the
goal itself, the desire for it, and the emotions surrounding attaining or failing to attain it."
D. MCCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY 195 (1961).
10 Parliamentary diplomacy, a term derived from a certain similarity between interna-
tional conferences and national parliaments, overlaps largely with conference diplomacy,
and is described by Dean Rusk as a
type of multilateral negotiation which involves at least four factors: First, a
continuing organization with interests and responsibilities which are broader
than the specific items that happen to appear upon the agenda at any particular
time-in other words, more than a traditional international conference called to
cover specific agenda. Second, regular public debate exposed to the media of mass
communication and in touch, therefore, with public opinion around the globe.
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ties of cooperation, even in a world scarred by cleavages, when a
major interest common to all was at stake. If the United Nations is
to be relevant through the last quarter of the twentieth century, it
must arrest the present trend toward being long on extremist doc-
trine and short on constructive procedure.1' Otherwise, even the
most innocuous issues on the international agenda will be conten-
tious, as tactics in politicized fora are exploited by participants who
lose sight of their real interests and succumb to the temptation of
scoring propaganda points. In this climate, parliamentary
diplomacy is flaccid; individual state reactions are disciplined and
subordinated to group interests. Conformity becomes an ideal.
There is a breakdown in articulate give and take as participants lose
their ability to communicate sincerely with others who have a dif-
ferent view.
Greater awareness of the class interest of the Third World1" in
social and economic reform has focused attention on the capacity of
the international system for a revisionist bias. The claims collected
under the NIEO call can be viewed as a class action suit filed in the
fora of the international community. However, the "jural relation-
ships" in this class action may render the class suit spurious because
a common relief is not sought. Indeed, there exist "class contradic-
tions." Rich OPEC states are developing GNPs per capita rivaling
those of the wealthiest industrialized nations. As with municipal
civil procedure, a central dilemma is the tension between substance
and form.'"
Parliamentary diplomacy conceived as adjective law, by defini-
tion, exists for the sake of something else. To what substantive
ends should procedure be a handmaiden? Parliamentary
diplomacy is a means of augmenting other inducements that
Third, rules of procedure which govern the process of debate and which are
themselves subject to tactical manipulation to advance or oppose a point of view.
And lastly, formal conclusions, ordinarily expressed in resolutions, which are
reached by majority votes of some description, on a simple or two-thirds majority
or based upon a financial contribution or economic stake-some with and some
without a veto.
Rusk, Parliamentary Diplomacy-Debate vs. Negotiation, 26 WORLD AFFAIRS INTERPRETER
121, 123 (Summer 1955).
" When extremism prevails, a Kuhnian dilemma ensues in which the two models are pit-
ted against one another in such a manner as to make the debate circular. Each side uses its
model to argue in that model's defense.
" See note 3 supra.
" See Max Weber's treatment of "the insoluble conflict between the formal and substan-




states have for conducting themselves in conformity with con-
stitutive prescriptions. These inducements include the ad-
monitory effect of the substantive law (e.g., duty to adhere to the
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda), minimizing uncertainty by
resolving legal and extra-legal controversy, and the avoidance of
costs resulting from a failure to give effect to the goals of con-
stitutive law.
In pleading for a greater share of the global wealth, the G-77
perceives itself to be presenting the historic meaning of a
universally-binding constitutive document, the U.N. Charter. This
school of interpretation looks to the Charter's article 55, which
states that the U.N. shall promote "higher standards of living, full
employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and
development," and article 56, according to which "all Members
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in Article 55." The G-77 has succeeded in promoting
economic development as an overriding objective of U.N. ac-
tivities. This influence on U.N. agenda formation has been
engineered to a large extent through parliamentary diplomacy.
However, as a decisionmaking technique, parliamentary diplo-
macy has been overtaxed."' Increasingly, contemporary debates
between North and South concerning the options that will pro-
mote the largest net aggregate of common interests are showing
strain. Without a more systematically developed and carefully
refined approach to parliamentary diplomacy, constitutive
prescriptions originating from this process will exhibit little con-
tent or creativity. Much of the confusion attending contemporary
discussion of items on the North-South agenda might, for example,
be removed if claims were encouraged by procedural means to be
posited in terms of factual differentiation rather than in the
question-begging terms of "equity" and "efficiency."
Parliamentary diplomacy can be a medium for the manipulation
of interdependence by competing states, individually or in groups,
" To inquire into parliamentary diplomacy is to examine the quality of constitutive pro-
cess and authoritative decision in public international law. Procedures used in multipartite
fora of the United Nations system affect the critical value choices underpinning constitutive
prescriptions. As a policy instrument for achieving authoritative adjustments in the effec-
tive distribution of world values, parliamentary diplomacy-when the process is work-
ing-contributes to clarity descriptively, about what values are regarded as best serving
common interests of the international community. For a discussion of authoritative deci-
sion, see McDougal, Some Basic Theoretical Concepts about International Law: A Policy-
Oriented Framework of Inquiry. 4 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 337 (1960).
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for their own benefit. However, its democratic nature raises the
policy issue of reasonableness in common interest. 5 An expansion
and strengthening of parliamentary diplomacy to promote reason-
ableness in world politics does not require the kind of centraliza-
tion of power that world federalists have envisaged. 6 It requires
that international organizations be allowed to develop greater
autonomy, not in the sense of ceasing to be "expressions of the in-
terests of particular states or other international actors," 7 but in
the sense of expressing world order interests, those long and
short-term interests of states which aim, if not at maintaining the
system, at least at maintaining moderation. 8
Although parliamentary diplomacy rarely imposes a direct con-
straint on the behavior of states, it serves nonetheless as an "in-
stitutional device for communicating to the policymakers of various
states a consensus of the nature of the international system."' 9
Thus, it can be argued that this communication function acts as an
indirect constraint. Parliamentary diplomacy coordinates expecta-
tions and communicates claims that can provide states with a zone of
predictability or comity. While it is beneficial for expectations in in-
terstate relations to be synchronized, the decentralized nature of
the international system is not conducive to control of uncertainty.
The pressure of a crisis-ridden system tends to put the com-
petitively urgent above the cooperatively important. The
language of the interactive model is drowned out by the language
of the dirigiste model. However, proponents of the dirigiste model
should not forget that public bargaining is the central function of
international organization:
Depending on the politics of the Organization (U.N.) there is con-
stantly present within it a bargaining process and potential to
'5 As one commentator has noted:
International law, like all law, gains some strength from the liveliness and preci-
sion of our potential sense of guilt; but it also is supported by any expectations of
the actors that their long-term interests may be convergent, or even by the ex-
pectation of each actor that his own divergent interests will prevail in the long
run.
Deutsch, The Probability of International Law, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
81 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffman eds. 1968).
" Keohane, Institutionalization in the United Nations General Assembly, 23 INT'L
ORGANIZATION 859, 862 (1969).
"7 Id. See also E. HAAS, TANGLE OF HOPES: AMERICAN COMMITMENTS AND WORLD ORDER 220
(1969).
11 S. HOFFMAN, GULLIVER'S TROUBLES, OR THE SETTING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 233
(1968).
11 Coplin, International Law and Assumptions about the State System, 17 WORLD POL.
615, 617 (July 1965).
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encourage trade-offs and compromises between opposed groups
of states. For instance, the United States may exchange its sup-
port or abstention on the issue of Chinese representation. Such
bargains may be tacit, implicit, or explicit. It is difficult, of
course, to gain insight into the dynamics of this bargaining pro-
cess and virtually impossible to acquire data on specific bargain-
ing patterns. Nevertheless, the bargaining process that takes
place in various United Nations arenas determines to a great ex-
tent the shape of action that is undertaken."
To a large extent, United Nations conferences have been ig-
nored as an arena for discerning bargaining patterns in parliamen-
tary diplomacy. Disciplined inquiry that does not lapse into for-
malistic or sentimental modes of analysis rarely is evident in the
postmortem analyses done by diplomatists. Yet, the international
conference is at the operational core of the sovereign state's new
negotiatory life in a diplomatic topography of unbounded
multilateralism. With the number and diversity of U.N. sponsored
conferences growing rapidly, it would be helpful to standardize
procedures for identification of conference themes and evaluation
of conference outcomes and implementation. In large part,
because conferences have been perceived as epiphenomenal, their
significance has been framed in dirigiste terms. In other words,
meaning has been conferred upon conferences a priori and in
tandem with overarching designs. Approached as interactive
devices, greater intellectual investment in the study of the politics
of conference diplomacy could reap such benefits as forum cost-
effectiveness, improved and more realistic policy outcomes, and
insights into international agenda formation and control.
B. The Conference Coordinate
In 1979, 900 conferences were attended by official U.S. delega-
tions.2 To be sure, the 1970s were the decade of the U.N. mega-
conferences: the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment
(Stockholm, 1972); U.N. World Population Conference (Bucharest,
1974); U.N. World Food Conference (Rome, 1974); U.N. World Con-
ference on Human Settlements (Vancouver, 1976); and the U.N. Con-
ference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD)
(Vienna, 1979). These conferences were billed by the U.N. as global
' Falk, The United Nations: Various System of Operation, in THE UNITED NATIONS IN IN-
TERNATIONAL POLITICS 197 (L. Gordenker ed. 1971).
"1 Inter-office memorandum (Dec. 7, 1979). Office of International Conferences, Bureau of
International Organization, Department of State.
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inquiries into alternative futures for the human race.' The impor-
tance to the world community of the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development and the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference has conferred
upon these conferences long-term institutional legitimacy.
However, in the 1970s, a host of less-publicized conferences were
convened, including, to name a few, the U.N. Cocoa Conference,
U.N. Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names,
U.N. Conferences to Consider Amendments to the Single Conven-
tion on Narcotic Drugs, the U.N. Wheat Conference, several
Regional Cartographic Conferences, and the U.N. Pledging Con-
ference on the United Nations Industrial Development Organiza-
tion (UNIDO).
If the twentieth century has witnessed a boom in conference
diplomacy, this diplomatic model is not new.1 Even before inter-
mittent diplomacy was overtaken by permanent diplomatic
representation in the fifteenth century, situations had developed
in which bilateral channels were inadequate because problems
often arose between more than two states. Consequently, con-
" Report of the Secretary-General on Work of Organization, at 135, U.N. Doe. A/10001
(June 16, 1974).
1 A pocket book on the League of Nations, prepared for "senior boys in the Public
Schools" and commissioned by a subcommittee of the Head Masters' Conference, notes that
"contraction of the world" had produced "notable examples of the interdependence of na-
tions." One example is to be seen in the swift growth of the number of International Con-
ferences, meetings of people from many countries to talk over things that concern them
all. N. SMITH, THE DAWN OF WORLD ORDER 61 (1932). The following graph appeared in the
book:
The 6 gures given above the columns show the number of
international congrmset held during the decades indicated at the"
base* (subject to slight correction in the cae d the last column).
Id. at 61.
1840- 1850 - 1860- 18"O- 1880 - 180-1900-1910 -1920
1849 1859 1869 18TS 1889 1899 1909 1919 1929
NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES MUD FROM 38 VO 19*9
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cerned parties would enter into multilateral negotiations in the
form of the international conference.24
In the contest of power processes and the relation of doctrines
and practices vis-a-vis agreements, deprivations, and private
associations to world order values, conference diplomacy offers
general procedures by which international community coercion is
organized and exercised. Conference diplomacy affects the out-
comes of the comprehensive world constitutive process of
authoritative decision." The different types of decisions that fall
under this rubric are conveniently categorized by Myres S.
McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell in terms of seven functions: in-
telligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, ter-
mination, and appraisal.' In contrast to the conventional descrip-
tion of the different phases in authoritative decision in such terms
as "legislative", "executive", "judicial", and "administrative", the
categories identified by McDougal and Lasswell permit both
greater precision and comprehensiveness in describing the
various authority functions encompassed by conference
diplomacy.
1. The Intelligence Function
Conferences are an important tool of discovery for both govern-
mental and nongovernmental actors. Two central purposes of
' Procedural matters were not always resolved with dispatch. The Congress of
Westphalia (1664-1668) lasted so long because, aside from the substance of negotiation,
many complicated and delicate problems of procedure and precedence had to be resolved.
For example, it took about five years to work out the arrangements for safe conducts and
acceptable meeting places before the sessions could convene, and it required seven months
to satisfy all parties regarding the "full powers" of the delegates.
For further discussion, see Part I, § D. infr.
Succinctly defined, those functions are:
(a) Intelligence: Obtaining information about the past, making estimates of the
future, planning;
(b) Promoting: Urging proposals;
(c) Prescribing: Projecting authoritative policies;
(d) Invoking: Confronting concrete situations with provisional characterization
in terms of a prescription to concrete circumstances;
(e) Applying: Final characterization and execution of a prescription in a concrete
situation;
(f) Terminating: Ending a prescription or arrangement without the scope of a
prescription; and
(g) Appraising: Comparison between goals and performance.
McDougal & Lasswell, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CALIF. L. REV. 362, 387
(1971). See also H. LASSWELL, A PREVIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES 85-97 (1971); McDougal,
Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in 1
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73, 131-54 (R. Falk and C. Black eds. 1969).
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discovery are to narrow the issues and to obtain necessary factual
information. All international conferences involve exchanges of in-
formation to a varying degree. Intergovernmental conferences
specifically organized to exchange information on a certain sub-
ject or series of related subjects are somewhat similar in
character to private scientific congresses. Examples are the U.N.
Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to Less
Developed Areas (Geneva, 1963), the U.N. Conference on the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Geneva, 1955, 1958, 1964), and
the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development.
On a smaller scale, many committees, subcommittees, and work-
ing parties of the U.N. and the specialized agencies work for the
exchange of information.
2. The Promoting Function
By drawing attention to issues, conferences add intensity of de-
mand to expectation. In other words, conferences contribute to ad-
vocacy of policy alternatives. The promotion of peace has been the
subject of numerous conferences, ranging from the San Francisco
Conference of 1945, which decided on the text of the United Na-
tions Charter, to the 1966 conference of the Legal Sub-Committee
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which
agreed on a draft Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space. Ideally, the
Islamic Republic of Iran could have called an international con-
ference to air its grievances against the United States and to
make known its preferred bilateral relationship rather than tak-
ing the personnel of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran hostage.
3. The Prescribing Function
This is a key function in the annual conferences of the major
organs of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The
U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Economic and Social Council,
the Assembly of the World Health Organization, the plenary con-
ferences of the International Labor Organization, FAO, UNESCO,
WHO, ITU, etc., all serve as a forum for possible adoption of both
binding and nonbinding recommendations to governments.
There are also conferences where general discussion takes
place, yet where the practice of making recommendations to
governments on the basis of draft resolutions submitted by
delegations is exceptional. Examples are the annual meetings of
the Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
[Vol. 11:1
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Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
At these meetings, a number of formal decisions relating to the
operations of the IBRD and the IMF are taken. One of the prin-
cipal binding decisions made, usually in the plenary conference of
an organization, is approval of the budget of the organization and
the manner in which it is assessed. Once this decision is made,
every government is bound to pay its share according to the ap-
proved scale of assessment.
4. The Invoking Function
Conferences can improve access to invocation. For instance, in
this context, individuals increasingly are being accorded the com-
petence to invoke processes of transnational decision for protec-
tion of their rights. Bodies contributing to this trend include the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Human Rights
Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and its Optional Protocol, the Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Racial Discrimination, the European Commission on
Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. Similarly, the Governing Board of the International Labor
Organization, the Executive Board of the World Health Organiza-
tion and of UNESCO, the Executive Committee of the World
Meteorological Organization, the Administrative Council of the In-
ternational Telecommunication Union, the Executive Boards of
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
the International Monetary Fund, the Governing Council of the
United Nations Development Program, and the Executive Com-
mittee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, all routinely confront concrete situations that require
provisional characterizations of events in terms of community
prescriptions.
5. The Applying Function
Conferences are useful for marshalling consensus and for
negotiating formal instruments for codifying consensus. The
following are from a long list of examples:
(a) The International Atomic Energy Agency Statute Con-
ference (New York, 1956), which, on the basis of a draft prepared
by an intergovernmental committee, considered, modified, and
then approved the statute for a new international organization;
(b) The Law of the Sea Conferences of 1958 and 1960, which
19811
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drew up draft treaties defining various rights and obligations of
states; and
(c) The Stockholm Conference of 1967, where the convention
establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) was approved.
Various periodic conferences also serve to negotiate international
agreements. The U.N. General Assembly, over a period of nearly
twenty years, drafted and then approved (in 1966) the Interna-
tional Human Rights Covenants (one on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights and one on Civil and Political Rights). The annual
conferences of the International Labor Organization often con-
sider and approve draft conventions concerning labor matters.
The principal objective in application is to put prescriptions into
controlling practice. To perform the applying function, interna-
tional bodies monitor, investigate, and otherwise satisfy
themselves -often by convening conferences -that prescriptions
are being observed.
6. The Terminating Function
Budgetary appropriations often determine the continuing im-
plementation of a prescription or mark its demise. For the U.N.
Development Program, the program of the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, th, World Food Program, and various other
programs, annual conferences are held in which governments an-
nounce their voluntary contributions for the next year. On one
hand, these pledging conferences provide the necessary indication
of how much financial support a program will have in the coming
year, and, on the other hand, they speed up the decision of each
government on its financial contribution. Most governments
prefer to avoid the embarrassment of informing a pledging con-
ference that they are not yet in a position to announce their con-
tribution.
7. The Appraising Function
Conferences dealing with the establishment of a new organiza-
tion and the elaboration of its statute usually are confronted with
a series of separate, identifiable questions of considerable impor-
tance, such as:
(a) the criteria for admission as a member;
(b) the rules for voting;
(c) the relations to existing organizations working in the same
or allied fields; and
[Vol. 11:1
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(d) the powers of the organs that will govern the new organiza-
tion or program.
Each of these various issues may give rise to differences of opin-
ion. For example, on the question of membership, certain countries
advocate universality of membership with any state allowed entry.
Other countries advocate a more limiting entry clause, excluding
states that are not members of the United Nations or of any
specialized agency or that are not parties to the statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice. On voting, numerous systems are
available, each having its supporters and opponents. If there is to
be a clause that important questions shall be decided by a two-
thirds majority vote, the definition of "important questions" can
cause long and difficult discussions. There may also be efforts to
write into the statute some sort of conciliation procedure prior to
voting.
Discussion,,'f o, tLII relatiU an" u the uivision of activities between
existing organizations and the new body will find partisans of
these organizations defending the latter's postulated interests.
When UNCTAD was established, certain countries believed that
the autonomy and work fields of GATT should be protected. The
precise relationship between UNCTAD and GATT, however, was
not spelled out in the resolution establishing UNCTAD. The
result was a certain amount of continuing uncertainty as to the
division of work between the two organizations. When UNIDO
was established, existing specialized agencies concerned with cer-
tain aspects of industrialization stressed that their areas of activi-
ty should not be encroached upon by UNIDO. For example, the
ILO was anxious to ensure that its extensive activities in the field
of vocational training would not be affected unfavorably. This
assurance was obtained by a modification of the text of the draft
resolution establishing UNIDO.
The size and attributes of the organs administering a new body
is another issue on which there may be a division of views. Some
countries prefer that a maximum of powers be given to the all-
membership organ (the "general conference" or "assembly");
others prefer that the limited-membership "executive committee"
or "board" be given considerable authority. The preference may
be affected by a state's estimate of the likelihood that it will be
elected to the "executive committee" type of organ.
Appraising applies the intelligence and promoting functions to
the continuous task of selecting policy options acceptable to the
community. As a decision function, appraising bridges the interac-
tive and dirigiste models-neither can afford to be wholly
1981]
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oblivious to gaps between performance and postulated goals. By
focusing inquiry on authority functions rather than on authority
structures and by appraising the adequacy of decision processes
to secure desired outcomes, it may be possible to achieve a more
realistic perspective of the role of parliamentary diplomacy in in-
ternational life.
C. The United Nations Support Role
Much of the responsibility for organizing intergovernmental
conferences devolves upon the U.N. Despite the magnitude of
conference-servicing costs, both absolutely and as a percentage of
total U.N. expenditure ($43.9 million and 16.9 percent in 1975), lit-
tle attention has been given to refining procedures for determin-
ing conference-servicing requirements.'
At present, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) con-
tinues to coordinate the program meetings within its substantive
turf. Preparation of the overall annual calendar of U.N. con-
ferences was the responsibility of the Secretary-General from
1970 to 1975. Since 1975, this task has fallen upon the re-
established Committee on Conferences, which also has respon-
sibility for reviewing the pattern of conferences, acting on behalf
of the General Assembly in dealing between sessions with re-
quested departures from the calendar, and offering recommenda-
tions on the optimum apportionment of conference resources.'
One of the most obvious problems facing the Committee on Con-
ferences is the wide variety of subjects which come before the
U.N. A conference cannot be convened to address each item that
comes up. By the same token, even when a subject falls within its
jurisdiction, many U.N. organs will be unqualified to consider a
specific problem. Conferences, by narrowing the terms of
reference on a set of issues, can attract the requisite pool of com-
petence. This problem of diffusion is magnified for many coun-
tries, which must instruct and dispatch qualified delegations.
When you look at the hundreds of items on the U.N. agenda
throughout the year in its various bodies, you suspect that there
are many governments who simply do not instruct their
17 U.N. Doc. E/L. 1664/Add.3 Administrative and Financial Implications of Recommenda-
tions are contained in E/L. 1664. For a discussion of multiple issues and U.N. overcommit-
ment, see Young, The United Nations and the International System, in THE UNITED NA-
TIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (L. Gordenker ed. 1971).
" See G.A. Res. 3351, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp (No. 31) 124, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1979).
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delegates on the entire spectrum of policy represented by such
agenda. .. . How many nations, for example, have national in-
terests which are sufficiently universal in scope and character
as to engage them soberly and responsibly in all the principal
items on the agenda."
In the economic domain, issues may have important financial or
commercial implications. Therefore, except when minor matters of
procedure are involved, most delegations hesitate to take definite
action without clearance from their home offices. Delegations that
take a position on issues with financial implications without satis-
fying themselves that the financial authorities of their govern-
ment will in fact support their positions are placing themselves
and the conference in danger of irresponsible action. Conversely,
a delegation that is able to back its position with financial
resources is lable to play a more effective role at the conference.
Related to the problem of coordination of policy within a delega-
tion is the difficulty of coordinating policy in a national capital
among the authorities concerned. The importance of this problem
was recognized early in the history of the United Nations (Resolu-
tion 125 of the second session of the General Assembly urged
governments to establish appropriate procedures). In 1948,
UNESCO and the International Institute of Administrative
Sciences undertook a study on "National Administration and In-
ternational Organizations," which analyzed some of the factors in-
fluencing instructions to delegations at international meetings.,"
At its twenty-second session, the Economic and Social Council
adopted Resolution 630A II, which invited governments to pro-
vide information on their procedures for ensuring coordination at
the national level. This survey, which was later submitted to the
twenty-sixth Session of ECOSOC,31 contains valuable information
on national coordination in respect to U.N. matters. However,
ECOSOC made no comments or recommendations on the subject,
which involves delicate questions of domestic government
policies. If a government has a complex or decentralized system
which affects the authority and speed of the central authorities in
issuing instructions, it may be at a disadvantage in multipartite
fora relative to governments whose national decisionmaking pro-
cess is concentrated and quick.
Rusk, supra note 10, at 129.
o INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DES SCIENCES ADMINISTRATIVES, NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF FOURTEEN COUNTRIES (1951).
3' Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/3107 (1959).
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Finally, there is the question of coordination among blocks of
states. A present characteristic of the diplomatic landscape is the
tendency of the G-77 to act politically in unison against the
economic interests of many of its members. Among the OECD
countries, the failure to act in unison economically has incurred
political costs. A curious feature of Law of the Sea politics has
been the degree to which those members of the G-77 that are land-
locked and shelf-locked are mesmerized by their coastal brethren.
At the U.N. Conference on Technical Cooperation among Develop-
ing Countries (TCDC), on the other hand, a serious coordination
problem developed among Western countries, which could not even
agree to meet to exchange views or to discuss substantive policy
issues. 2 The principal obstacle to such desirable coordination was
a preconference, policy-level decision by the Scandinavian govern-
ments to avoid giving the appearance that the Western states
were taking or attempting a joint approach to the substance of the
Conference's work. The decision to follow "New York Rules" for
OECD coordination, which are limited to procedural matters, and
not "Geneva" or "Vienna Rules," which allow for substantive coor-
dination, was particularly harmful to the West at UNCSTD a year
later.
One of the principal stumbling blocks to a constructive outcome
at UNCSTD was the open advocacy of the Conference Secretary-
General of G-77 positions. A conference secretariat can play no
less significant a role in the smooth running of a conference than
individual delegations. Walter Bagehot suggested that in a con-
stitutional monarchy, a sagacious king would only want three
rights: the right to be consulted; the right to encourage; and the
right to warn." These rights extend fully to the secretary-general.
However, the secretariat must adopt a neutral posture toward all
parties if it is to maximize its utility. Gunnar Myrdal notes: "The
ECE Secretariat has in a few cases even been the neutral link
which has permitted government contacts that otherwise would
have been difficult or impossible to establish."" That is not to say
that a strong secretariat is undesirable.' Effective leadership is
' Dep't of State Unclassified Cable No. 7208 114 (1978). The cable, sent from Buenos Aires
in Sept. 1978, was drafted by Hervy Clark, Harry Glazer, and John McDonald, Jr.
's W. BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION ch. III (1964).
G. MYRDAL. REALITIES AND ILLUSIONS IN REGARD TO INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
23 (1955).




especially important in giving meaning to the prescribing function
in international law. 6
D. As a Source of Law
The tools and rules of international statecraft are functionally
blurred. International law creates, or consists of, both, as the case
may be. As with every legal system, international law is in con-
stant flux; its adequacy, merits, and defects, like those of every
legal system, depend in large measure on the foresight and
originality of thought that contribute to the creation, adaptation,
and perfection of the rules and institutions on all levels.
The impact of a conference via an international organization on
rules and attitudes cannot be minimized. For example, on the
recommendation of the International Monetary Fund, exchange
transactions, yesterday punishable as black market operations,
become permissible today and are, in fact, encouraged under a
new financial policy. A vitally important part of parliamentary
diplomacy, including its convention-making efforts, is directed at
inducing changes in the municipal legal system, be it the exten-
sion of the political rights of women or the prohibition of certain
types of forced labor, or the sale of narcotics, or racial discrimina-
tion, and so on.
The U.N. conference passes a resolution to establish a new in-
ternational organization and endows it with certain legal
prerogatives. However, to increase its authority with govern-
ments, new techniques must be developed, of which the most com-
mon to emerge (in international as in municipal government) is
Secretariat Intensity
A B C D
Statutory Position Personality of Confidence Secretariat
of executive head executive head in secretariat intensity
(1) strong active great high
(2) weak active great high
(3) weak active average medium
(4) weak passive small low
Memorandum at 3 (illustration II); UNCSTD Coordinator's Office, Dept. of State (June 9,
1978).
" See McDougal & Reisman, The Prescribing Function: How International Law is Made,
6 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 286 (1981). See also R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 5 (1963); Falk, On the
Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, in THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNA-
TIONAL SOCIETY 174-84 (R. Falk ed. 1970).
19811
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
rulemaking. The rules may be those required for operating a
postal system, for governing trade relationships, for the naming
or preparation of drugs, or for the classification of statistics.
These vary in the degree of their binding quality. Some rules are
totally binding and invariable obligations from which no reserva-
tion can be made, as in most ILO Conventions. Next, there are the
conventions that are amended successively so that, although the
obligations are binding once accepted, a party can choose the
degree to which it will extend its own commitment. Several Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) Con-
ventions,7 discussed below, are of this variety. Another type is
the convention to which reservations can be made, such as that of
the UPU. In addition, there are the recommended practices, for
example in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
Furthermore, compliance with ILO recommendations is urged, but
not obligatory.
Perhaps the most important element that affects the character
of the rulemaking authority is the nature and persistence of the
pressures which can be brought to bear at a later stage to secure
conformity. These may have more effect than constitutional rules
in determining the degree of authority gained. Examples of
pressures include organized cross-questioning and confrontation
employed in ILO and WMO, implementation procedures used in
ICAO, demands for regular information and subsequent question-
ing used in WHO, direct committee action to secure observance of
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ex-
pert and independent monitoring and assessment as used in ITU,
surveillance and cross-questioning used in IMF, and on-the-spot in-
spection as used in the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).
Rulemaking, however, is only the first and most basic technique
developed. Another is that of standard-setting: the promulgation,
not of explicit and definite rules, but of a general level of attain-
ment within a particular field. Some of the standards laid down by
ICAO and ILO are of this variety, as are many of those establish-
ed in the field of human rights. They allow a greater degree of
latitude in the manner by which a standard is achieved than a
rule; this usually means that the obligations are looser (and
sometimes easier to evade). Many of the same techniques are used
to ensure compliance with rules in the applying function: confron-
" See note 40 infrck and accompanying text.
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tation, cross-questioning, and regular reports. But because the
tests of compliance are more vague, because verification pro-
cedures are often lacking, and because in some cases the areas
concerned are more sensitive politically, it is doubtful that such a
high degree of compliance usually is attained.
A useful index of conference effectiveness is its impact not as
much on national policies as on legal codes. The codification of in-
ternational legislation ranges from the other-worldy-(1974 Conven-
tion on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space) to the
viscerally mundane (1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide). The evidence would sug-
gest that the U.N. specialized agencies have had considerable im-
pact on states via standard-setting and rule-promulgating, as well
as on discovery procedures. Indeed, at TCDC, these organizations
were excluded from the Conference Working Group and its
smaller Contact Group because they had perturbed the G-77.
The ILO, in particular, has been very effective. Its General Con-
ference, which met in Geneva in June 1976, approved measures to
strengthen the impact of ILO labor standards. At that conference,
ninety-four cases of progress were reported by fifty-five countries
that changed their law or practice as a result of ILO interven-
tions. However, the Conference discussed problems that had
arisen in forty-eight countries. It observed that sixteen countries
had not supplied required information that year. The Conference
Committee on the application of Conventions and Recommenda-
tions drew attention to problems of implementation of specified
ILO standards in Ethiopia, Haiti, Indonesia, Liberia, the Philip-
pines, Uganda, USSR, Tanzania, and Uruguay. Its formal requests
that their governments make every effort to ensure real progress
are a stinging form of public chastisement.
Conferences often are important redirectional devices for U.N.
agencies. For example, the World Employment Conference, which
also met in Geneva in June 1976, called on the ILO to establish a
worldwide program in support of household surveys to map the
nature, extent, and causes of poverty, to help countries establish
the necessary statistical and monitoring services, and to for-
mulate basic needs policies and to measure progress toward their
achievement. A Declaration of Principles and Program of Action
directed the ILO to make its technical services available to
member countries in carrying out policies for technology choice,
migration, and adjustment assistance. The Director-General of
ILO, Francis Blanchard, summing up the results of the Con-
ference, noted that the basic needs strategy was backed
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unanimously and he predicted that it would become a touchstone
for development policies. ' Evidence exists that it has had con-
siderable impact, particularly on donor foreign aid programs.39
The interface between the conference, the international
organization, and legal codification is illustrated clearly in the
establishment of a stable international forum to induce greater in-
terstate cooperation in sea transport. The Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) was conceived at the
U.N. Maritime Conference in Geneva in March 1948. However, it
was not until 1958 that the IMCO Convention requirement that it
be ratified by twenty-one states was met. Since becoming
operative, IMCO has played an active role in the promotion of
maritime safety.
This effort is typified by a number of international conventions
of which IMCO is custodian and which have been drawn up at
diplomatic conferences convened by IMCO. These include the In-
ternational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (the SOLAS
Convention), the International Convention on Load Lines, and the
International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships. It is
interesting to note that the last of these was a thorny problem,
which IMCO inherited from the League of Nations and which the
organization resolved successfully in 1969 after ten years of
gruelling work.
IMCO also has drafted several codes relating to general safety
standards, which as yet do not have mandatory force. Among
these are the Code for the Construction and Equipment of
Tankers, the Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships
carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk, and the Code for the Con-
struction and Equipment of Ships carrying Liquefied Gases in
Bulk (the "Gas Carrier Code").
To promote maritime safety, internationally agreed upon stan-
dards are necessary for the safe loading and stowage of cargoes.
Here, IMCO's major contribution is the International Maritime
Dangerous Goods Code, which has achieved worldwide recogni-
tion throughout shipping industries. In that massive tome, which
is updated constantly to keep pace with the appearance of new
products, dangerous goods are classified according to their in-
herent properties and hazards, and comprehensive guidelines are
given on their packaging, labelling, handling, and stowage. Other
types of cargo are covered by the Code of Safe Practice for Bulk
0 13 U.N. CHRONICLE 42 (July 1976).




Cargoes (dealing with ores, ore concentrates, and similar com-
modities) and the Code of Safe Practice for Timber Deck Cargoes.
Again, these codes are recommendatory in character.'"
Finally, rules have to be framed to regulate navigation at sea to
prevent collisions. Here, the International Regulations for Prevent-
ing Collisions at Sea are the principal tool; they were extensively
revised by IMCO and given the status of a Convention in 1972 at a
conference convened by IMCO. IMCO is endeavoring, in collabora-
tion with the ILO, to draw up minimum international training and
certification standards to be debated at a conference in 1981.
In 1954, the United Kingdom convened a conference to consider
the urgent question of controlling marine pollution caused by oil
discharged from ships-a growing menace stemming from the
switch from coal to oil both as a means of ship propulsion and as
an industrial fuel. The resulting instrument-the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1954),
designated IMCO as its depositary as soon as the organization
should come into being. Thus, IMCO has been active on the legal
aspects of marine pollution. Three instruments adopted under its
aegis testify to the success of its efforts: the 1969 Convention
relating to Intervention on the High Seas and its 1973 Protocol
(dealing with the rights of States to take action on the high seas
against the threat of pollution to their coasts and amenities), the
1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, and
the 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an International
Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage (covering the pay-
ment of adequate compensation for damage which States or in-
dividuals may suffer). These instruments are the direct results of
IMCO's post-Torrey Canyon program.
II. GOAL CLARIFICATION
A. The New Diplomatic Topography
A diffusion of power" and the accelerated development of a
global economy have altered diplomatic topography. A participa-
tion explosion in international life has been accompanied by a
quantum increase in the competence of foreign diplomatic
resources. Another consequence of increased participation is a
40 Meetings of the Committee of Exports on the Transport of Dangerous Goods are con-
vened regularly and result in reports by the Secretary General to ESCOR. See, e.g., Pro-
gram of Work of Committee on Transport of Dangerous Goods. U.N. Doc. EIL.1664/Add.5
(1975).
" For an extended discussion on this subject, see W. ROSTOW. THE DIFFUSION OF POWER
(1972).
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more complex world characterized by "all-at-onceness" in time and
place. For a state to rely totally on the homeostasis of world
diplomacy would be foolhardy. If the international system is to
maintain its stability, it will not be due to some miraculous self-
adjusting property. Rather, the procedures that facilitate interac-
tions among states will require strict and universal adherence.
For the OECD countries, a condition precedent is overcoming a
peculiar paradox. In the past, they praised international institu-
tions and tended not to use them. Today, they use them and tend
not to praise them.'2
On the village level, development do-gooders have learned that
in introducing a common privy, one villager is not going to avail
himself of this facility if his neighbor disregards it.' The collective
good of a more sanitary village does not come about with minority
compliance. The effectiveness of the U.N. at the level of the global
village is analogous to the village privy. It has been observed:
A moderate international system will be one in which global in-
ternational organization plays a major role in the muting of con-
flict and the spread of cooperation only if, in the first place,
there exists a broad procedural consensus among states which
makes of multinational institutions the legitimate channels for
the management of conflict and cooperation ... and if in the sec-
ond place, there exists a preference for universal channels over
regional ones."
Disillusionment with procedural pitfalls could lead to irreparable
damage to the relevance of the U.N. system. Already, there are
signs of willingness to work outside the U.N. A World Food Coun-
cil, the product of the 1974 Food Conference called by the U.N.
General Assembly, is operating outside the U.N. Similarly, the
Law of the Sea Conference is discussing establishment of an inter-
national seabed authority independent of the United Nations.
For some time, effective parliamentary diplomacy will be viewed
by many as quixotic. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane posit:
The idea that the United Nations should develop a capacity to
monitor, mediate, and establish norms for transnational
economic activities is an excellent one. The idea of employing
the tired old institution of conference diplomacy is a mistake.
" The author is indebted to Charles Maynes, former Assistant Secretary of State for In-
ternational Organization, for this point.
," Lecture by John D. Montgomery, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
(Oct. 10, 1979).
" Hoffman, International Organization and the International System, 24 INT'L ORGANIZA-
TION 389, 390 (1970).
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Given the political schisms of today's world, the classic model of
the diplomatic conference with a closely associated secretariat is
bound to drive the developed countries to create 'shadow' in-
stitutions where 'business' can be done. 5
Nonetheless, there is a present need for effective multilateral
structures and for what has been called a "third try at world
order."" This global process, a combination of bargains, systems,
and arrangements, must be approached in the interactive model.
In the absence of a consensus to entrust any state or group of
states with responsibility for world governance, the temptation to
go the dirigiste route must be resisted, despite problems which
apparently will yield only to world-scale solutions.
An environment for constructive bargaining cannot avoid
multilateralism. Harlan Cleveland presents the analogy that "a
diplomacy built on bilateral relations would be like mathematics
without the zero."'7 The centrality of multilateralism is partly a
function of the sheer number of actors in international relations;
as the number of countries increases one by one, the relationships
grow by logarithmic leaps. It is often a matter of simple efficiency
to deal with a group of states on whatever affects all members of
the group."
*5 Keohane & Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion, in
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 397 (R. Keohane & J. Nye eds. 1972).
to H. CLEVELAND, THE PLANETARY BARGAIN: PROPOSALS FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER TO MEET HUMAN NEEDS 1-16 (1975).
'7 Cleveland, The Management of Multilateralism, MURPHY COMMISSION REPORT 209
(1975).
48 The figure below shows that it would take 120 bilateral talks among 16 countries to
duplicate the accomplishments of one multilateral negotiation.
120 Bilateral Relationships
H. CLEVELAND. THE THIRD TRY AT WORLD ORDER 72 (1977).
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The problem, in part, is that multilateralism traditionally has
occupied a low position in the hierarchy of leadership stances. The
command posture implicit in hegemony and the go-first attitude of
unilateralism take precedence over the process of informed con-
sent that leadership connotes in multilateralism. It is difficult to
dismiss the notion that multilateralism means immobilization." In
the literature, parliamentary diplomacy often is treated as a closed
universe. Yet, this technique of authoritative decision follows the
same curve as the study of international law or the law of war.
Therefore, it is essential to discern the patterns of cooperation and
of muted conflict whose nature, evolution, and outcomes cannot be
separated from the global constitutive process.w The conference
may be viewed as a "surmising forum," to borrow Jouvenel's term,5'
through which to appraise the viability of each proposed policy
nexus and to discover and define the viability of new orders of rela-
tions.
B. Parliamentary Diplomacy and the United States
The NIEO class action led President Carter, shortly after he
took office, to commission Presidential Review Memorandum
(PRM) 8 on North-South issues, among fourteen other PRMs that
addressed foreign policy concerns. The American public was
reminded that "ultimately only America has the power to shape a
hostile world for itself."' Does accentuation or neglect of as cen-
tral a forum of populist participation as parliamentary diplomacy
contribute to shaping a hostile world? How does parliamentary
diplomacy affect the shaping of United States foreign policy at
home and abroad? 5
In the full flush of American power and opportunity following
the Second World War, American diplomacy could absorb, when it
chose, the cost of multilateral neglect. With the rest of the globe
Quadeer, The Futility of World Conferences, 19 INT'L DEV. REV. 13 (1977).
Oran Young remarks: "Throughout the history of the United Nations the impact of the
systemic environment on the Organization has far surpassed the impact of the Organization
on the system." Quoted in Young, The United Nations and the International System, 22
INT'L ORGANIZATION 902 (1968). Yet, underlying the establishment of the U.N. was the
perceived need for a mechanism to maintain a minimal level of moderation. Consider the
concept of "minimum world public order" developed by McDougal and Lasswell. See e.g.,
M. McDOUGAL. STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960).
8 B. JOUVENEL, THE ART OF CONJECTURE 277 (1967).
Brzezinski, U.S. Foreign Policy: the Search for Focus, 51 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 708, 726
(July 1973).




in ruins, the United States accounted for sixty percent of the
world's industrial production, fifty percent of its military spend-
ing, and a commanding share of its monetary reserves. In this con-
text, the task of American foreign policy lay primarily in deciding,
in American fora, what policies would be pursued rather than how
to persuade others to adopt these policies. With the passing of
this golden age, Dean Acheson's metaphor "present at the crea-
tion" can be resurrected.' The United States finds itself in a new
diplomatic epoch, the inauguration of which has been cumulative
rather than sudden, oblique rather than frontal. A creeping in-
terdependence has transformed the diplomatic topography. Due to
a "redistributed bargaining power on a number of key issues ...
the United States today has to negotiate for what it gets on many
issues."' Thus, for the first time, the United States must contend
seriously with the costs and benefits of parliamentary diplomacy.
1. A Systematic Approach
State Department officers are being forced to consider whether
the international conference, for policy planning purposes, fully
exploits its policy space. To determine the effectiveness and
potential of the international conference various questions should
be addressed. In an organizational context these include:
(a) What kinds of leadership (e.g., secretariat, presiding of-
ficers, delegations, geopolitical groups) are central to the con-
ference diplomacy process in achieving the preferred outcome?
(b) How does the composition of individual delegations impact
on conference output and how should delegation members be
selected?
(c) How do Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and their
"anti-conference" affect the preferred outcome?
(d) What tactics can be deployed to skirt contentious, often ex-
traneous issues?
(e) How important are negotiated and documentary prepara-
tions to the preferred outcome?
In the context of domestic inputs and the substance of conference
diplomacy, questions include:
(a) How much Congressional input is desirable?
D. ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT XVII
(1969).
N Manning, The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs, 55 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
306. 308 (1977).
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(b) Are inter-agency committees for conference preparation up
to the task of policy integration?
(c) Must issues be framed in national security terms, usually
imputed to a crisis-politics paradigm, before bureaucratic
consensus-building warms up to the challenge?
(d) Is the present screening process for the U.S. initiatives put
forth at U.N. conferences adequate?
(e) Is it possible to arrive at a creative balance between
domestic and foreign policies in the face of strong domestic NGO
opposition to a conference?
Among the questions that should be asked in evaluating con-
ference diplomacy outputs are:
(a) What criteria should be used to evaluate conference out-
comes?
(b) Have recent U.N. mega-conferences measurably influenced
U.S. policy?
(c) What is the U.S. track record on follow-up of conference
outputs?
(d) How does U.S. performance in preparing and otherwise
responding to the conference diplomacy agenda compare with
other countries? How can U.S. performance be improved?"
This kind of self-questioning is a necessary prelude to ad-
ministrative reform. It reflects an uneasiness with the outcomes
of both substantive and procedural policies. On July 9, 1975, for
example, Barbara M. White, while representing the United States
at the U.N. International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City,
cabled enthusiastically: "The U.S. achieved its principal objective:
passage of a world plan of action. 57 The cable concerned a con-
ference in which the U.S. had to vote against the final declaration
because the very weak language about women's rights in its text
was buried in an avalanche of accusations on extraneous subjects.
Similarly, a cable from the U.N. Population Conference in
Bucharest, which had ended in precisely the same manner,
reported that the United States realized its principal objectives."
Shortly after being charged with responsibility for U.S. represen-
tation at the 'U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, Elliot Richardson
observed that the State Department had not developed consistent
Agenda questions prepared by the author for a Round Table on Conference Diplomacy
in the Seventies at the Dept. of State, Nov. 27, 1978.
Dep't of State Unclassified Cable No. 6716, 3 (1975).
" For a strident critique of United States parliamentary diplomacy, see Luttwak,
Masochism at the UN, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 16, 1978).
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or comprehensive instructions for U.S. delegations to multipartite
fora.59 The need for uniformity extends beyond preparations for
multilateral negotiations.
Traditionally, the romance with inputs in conference diplomacy
has overshadowed the more central consideration of conference
outputs. This observation is supported by the absence of any kind
of evaluative process for assessing conference outcomes. Although
each conference has its own life, such a taxonomy could be devis-
ed, notwithstanding the varying substantive topics.
A key component of conference planning and evaluation in the
future should be a framework for conference preparations which:
(a) defines conference inputs, outputs, purposes, and preferred
outcomes in objectively verifiable terms;
(b) hypothesizes the causal linkage between inputs, outputs,
purpose, and preferred outcome;
(c) articulates the assumptions, ie., external influences and fac-
tors that will affect the causal linkages; and
(d) defines the indicators that will permit subsequent measure-
ment or verification of achievement of the defined outputs, pur-
pose, and preferred outcomes.
A Conference Performance Tracking System (CPTS) could be
developed for tracking the actual versus the preferred outcomes
of conferences. The CPTS would entail (a) the preparation of a net-
work chart that relates performance indicators to each other and
to time and (b) the use of the chart as a basis for conference
monitoring and reporting. Such a system would contribute to the
effectiveness of the preparatory stage of conferences by entering
detailed conference histories into the pool of resources from which
planners might draw.
2. Conference Preparation
At present, a scope paper is prepared by every U.S. delegation
to major international conferences. This document usually em-
phasizes the proscriptive rather than the normative; what should
not happen at the plenary rather than what should. Cables from
U.S. delegations reporting the outcomes of several recent mega-
conferences reflect this vagueness of purpose when they begin:
"The U.S. achieved all its principal objectives." It would be more
helpful if objectives are identified positively at an early stage and
' Sanger, Richardson on the Art of Negotiation, Harvard Crimson, Dec. 1, 1978, at 1, col.
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stated in explicit and precise terms that are objectively verifiable,
regardless of whether these terms are quantitative or qualitative.
To be effective, the essential elements of evaluation must be in-
corporated into conference preparations at the earliest stages,
thereby assuring that the strategy will permit and facilitate
measurement of progress toward preferred outcomes and deter-
mination as to why the conference is or is not achieving its prefer-
red outcome. Conferences need a definable set of objectives that
can be distinguished from indices.
For greater emphasis on the key issues, it would be useful to
design a code that indicates the purpose of individual conferences.
The primary reason(s) for convening a conference is not always
evident from its agenda. The use of purpose codes is intended to
(a) encourage greater focus by conference coordinators on pur-
poses and preferred outcomes, (b) facilitate information retrieval
within bureaucracy, and (c) permit government hierarchies to
assign shadow costs to conference-related initiatives. Purpose
codes could improve screening of initiatives and budgetary provi-
sioning because conference purpose rather than conference com-
position would be the basis for determining the appropriation
from which activities would be funded. Only on rare occasions
have U.S. delegations attended conference plenaries with approved
budgetary allocations for the proposals in their pockets.
A carefully elaborated purpose code would help synchronize ex-
pectations. In the field of Science and Technology for Develop-
ment one could envisage the following purpose code summary
titles:
(a) Science and Technology Policy
(b) Science and Technology Education
(c) Science and Technology Institutional Development
(d) Technical Information and Transfer
(e) Appropriate Technology




In turn, each of these rubrics can be disaggregated. Applied
Research, for example, consists of the following:
(1) diffusion of applied research performed by governments;
(2) diffusion of applied research performed by universities;
(3) diffusion of applied research performed by industry;




(5) diffusion of applied research performed by institutions
other than the above.
Of course, the issue of analytic determinacy does not by itself
resolve the question in the appraising function of whether the
postulated objectives are normatively desirable.
C. Crisis and Mood Politics
The purpose of a conference, no matter how central, intersects
its political and historical context. We are constantly reminded
that bureaucratic inertia can be shaken off when issues are framed
in a national security calculus, i.e., where a crisis politics
paradigm prevails. The language of this model appeared in an arti-
cle by Joao Frank da Costa, Secretary-General of the U.N. Con-
ference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD):
Developed countries so far have expressed little enthusiasm for
the concepts of a New International Economic Order. I believe,
however, that this may well be the last realistic attempt to
achieve amicable and acceptable international relations. The only
alternative I see is a new wave of distrust and disruption be-
tween developed and developing countries, in which everyone is
bound to lose and obviously the 'haves' even more than the
'have nots.' Attempts to retain the monopoly of science and
technology in the developed nations must result in a politically
explosive situation and a threat to world peace.
Crises increase the benefits and lower the risk of governmental
action. Predictably, conferences are most successful in achieving
targets at the output level when a crisis politics model holds. This
was the case at the U.N. World Food Conference, where the crisis
proportions of the world food situation improved the prospects
that collective benefits would be internalized by all parties.
Perceptions of crisis have contributed to the formation of coali-
tions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which have made
their presence felt at several United Nations conferences, notably
the Stockholm Environment Conference. Coalitions promise to
have an even greater impact in the future as their networks and
worldviews are internalized by governments. NGOs also are
responsible for recruitment of participants on the periphery and
provide an organizational center of gravity. They play a critical
role in generating a new mood, especially when media-related
NGOs become involved.
' Da Costa, Instruments for Development, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 56 (Oct. 1978).
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The distinctive feature of the mood politics model, besides its
strong norm-creating influence, is its characteristic capacity for
exerting clarifying movement. In accordance with a U.N. General
Assembly resolution, the Committee on Science and Technology
for Development set up an intergovernmental group that gave
priority in its preparations for UNCSTD to the objective of "pro-
viding a common definitional basis for understanding and compar-
ing the scientific and technological activities related to develop-
ment of the developing countries, conducted in the developed and
developing countries."6 The importance of generally agreed upon
definitions is obvious if delegates to conferences are not to talk
past one another. John W. McDonald, Jr. relates that when he
chaired the U.S. intra-governmental group that prepared for
Stockholm, his first order of business was to arrive at a definition
of "environment" acceptable to all. Initially, he received twenty
disparate definitions from the same number of mission-agencies
represented.2
Although the global plan of action that may surface in the flood
of ideological verbiage at an international forum is often not likely
to be implemented, parliamentary gatherings, such as the major
U.N. conferences in the 1970s, did generate a global awareness of
certain dangers that threaten all states. Beyond brute empirical
facts and naked statistics, these conferences conjured a mood with
their clarion calls for international cooperation. By the same
token, conferences may perpetuate and diffuse global mythology
or, less euphemistically, globaloney.1
The conjuring of a mood on a global scale defies crisp analysis.
We know that it occasionally draws heavily on an international
law sensibility and vice versa. Indeed, the mood created must in-
filtrate international law, defined as "a kind of long-range consen-
sus on the limits, rights, duties and possibilities of joint action by
states."" Moreover, this mood can affect the discrepancy between
" E.S.C. Res. 1949, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 10, U.N. Doc. E/5683 (1975).
6 Interview with John W. McDonald, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to TCDC (Dec. 12, 1978).
The implication of much of what was said at the World Population Conference in
Bucharest in 1974 was that a sufficient rate of development will solve any population prob-
lem in time. But what precisely is a "sufficient rate of development"? It clearly is not
overall average economic growth, which so frequently benefits the few and bypasses the
many. Most countries in Latin America, for example, have considerably higher per capita
income than countries in Asia and Africa. Yet fertility rates are not proportionately lower.
That, in part, is a function of the serious inequalities in income distribution in the Latin
American region.
" Hoffman, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 15, at 36.
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how states actually behave and how the rules prescribe that they
ought to behave. 5 By influencing the general consensus about
reality, parliamentary diplomacy facilitates the external environ-
ment's adjustment to international law." However, when
parliamentary diplomacy and other devices of the United Nations
mood creation apparatus read into political reality transparent fic-
tions, the external environment's synapses of transmission
become overtaxed and law development is retarded." Mood crea-
tion with this denoument is dysfunctional. The United Nations is
weakened because its attempts at policy conditioning are
unrealistic;68 the perception that the state is above the law is rein-
forced.
It may be helpful to devise a typology that both student and
practitioner of conference diplomacy can use when looking at in-
dividual conferences. A crude set of models might include
characterizations of mega-conferences as legislative forum (legal
model), as all-inclusive summit (political model), as corporate board
meeting (commercial model), or as scientific gathering (technical
model). These models entail trade offs that affect expectations and
outcomes, as was illustrated in Buenos Aires by the U.N. Con-
ference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
(TCDC). On several occasions, items more properly addressed by
such fora as UNCTAD V and UNCSTD surfaced only to be
skirted. Because TCDC was clearly lodged in the scientific gather-
ing model, consensus was reached to sidestep these contentious
items. This kind of agreement is an important element in isolating
the key issues a conference will address. Just as political summits
usually are technically sanitized, it is desirable that technical
gatherings be depoliticized. Granted, the political-technical ten-
sion is not so easily dismissed with a model.
The conference as a particular kind of model does affect the
composition of delegations. In the technical model, experts and
not generalists will prevail. In the commercial model, greater
transparency of the government/private sector relationship could
65 Richard Falk reminds us: "[Plerfect compliance suggests the triviality of a rule .... If
there is no pressure on the rule, there would be no social function for it." Falk, Janus
Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL
STRIFE 230 (J. Rosenau ed. 1964).
At any given point, reality equals status quo plus attempts at, or ideas about, changing
it.
i G-77 attempts to impose undue restrictions on transnational corporations and other at-
tempts to facilitate technology transfers come to mind.
" The Zionism equals racism analogy is illustrative.
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result in a more coherent policy outcome. In the political and legal
models, national parliamentarians could be expected to play a
greater role, bringing to bear their parliamentary skills. Indeed, it
is this last model, with its crosscutting implications and attempts
by militant G-77 spokesmen to "legislate" their maximum aims,
that merits greatest attention.
The challenge of parliamentary diplomacy, therefore, is not the
inevitable tension with political reality, but the nature and scope
of this tension. The G-77, in seeking to inculcate international con-
sciousness of its class interest in international institutions cannot,
for instance, extrapolate from dirigiste economic policies in Third
World domestic orders. To presuppose that governments in coun-
tries with free-market economies can contravene the legal protec-
tion accorded to proprietary information in order to facilitate
technology transfer to the developing world is an inference of
transformation, ie., wishful thinking. Yet, from the dirigiste
perspective of the G-77, the requirements of order at times appear
secondary in a milieu that needs maximum normative correction.
Reform to gain equality of opportunity takes priority over stability,
particularly when the structural institutionalization of dependence
is perceived as encompassing all areas of interaction between North
and South.
III. TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
A. Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Nondecisionmaking
Paradigm
It can be argued that any inquiry into parliamentary diplomacy
deals as much with how United Nations decisions are not made as
with how they are made. Because multipartite fora are discerners
of majorities and not consistencies, the problem, in part, is struc-
tural. Every majority is temporary. Yesterday's old majority
becomes today's new minority and usually retains enough clout to
block the wishes of the new majority. However, the analogy to
domestic legislative deadlock is limited.
The concept of majority rule is problematic in world politics,
particularly when it draws on the fiction of a world community
able and willing to make of the U.N. a sanction-wielding force. The
G-77 should be able to see through this Sorelian myth, having
banded together in part as a reaction to superpower attempts to
rally a majority against its rival and to enlist the U.N. behind its
own policies. Illusions have their virtue when they inspire action.
The fiction of a world community has made it possible for the
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organs of the U.N. to concern themselves with most of the impor-
tant political and economic issues that agitate the international
system and to promote that equalization of concern which is a
rudimentary, first factor of homogenization in a highly diverse
and uneven world. Yet, as a result, a gap between attempts and
achievements, resolutions and resolution, motions and motion, has
appeared-a gap no less frustrating than the original Charter's
gap between legal possibilities and political aspirations. The ma-
joritarian illusion has been short lived. An obvious discrepancy
between votes and compliance developed almost as soon as the
Uniting for Peace Resolution was adopted. Thus, the resolution
was never fully put into effect insofar as collective security was
concerned.
Symptomatic of a paralyzing majoritarianism is the growing
tendency to arrive at decisions in the U.N. with little or no regard
to previous U.N. decisions or to established conventions." When
not stonewalling, the New Minority0 is engaged in damage-
limitation exercises at international fora. A classic illustration of
this defensive posture is reflected in the following wrap-up report
filed by the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Conference on Technical
Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC):
The U.S. achieved its major objectives which were to present a
positive, helpful, and forthcoming position towards TCDC; pre-
vent the conference from addressing broad economic coopera-
tion issues; prevent the intergovernmental overview committee
for TCDC from changing the character and composition of the
U.N. Development Program's Governing Council, and avoid the
creation of a TCDC Fund."
Even a cursory review of the dynamics of conference nondeci-
sionmaking shows the extent to which (distinguishing between
key and routine political decisions in decisionmaking of concrete
, Lauterpacht wrote of U.N. resolutions:
Whatever may be the content of recommendation, and whatever may be the
nature and circumstances of the majority by which it has been reached, it is
nevertheless, a legal act by the principal organ of the United Nations which
members of the United Nations are under a duty to treat with a degree of respect
appropriate to a resolution of the General Assembly.
South-West Africa Voting Procedure Case, [1955] I.C.J. 120. This respect, according to
Lauterpacht, includes the consideration of the resolution in good faith and the offering of
detailed reasons for any decision to reject it. Id.
7 The New Minority is comprised of the Western powers, who are perceived by the G-77
as status quo actors with a retentionist bias.
" Dep't of State Unclassified Cable No. 7208, supra note 32, at 1.
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issues) the New Minority still influences those community values
and those international institutions that tend to limit the scope of
actual decisionmaking to "safe" issues."2 Nonetheless, alarmists in
the OECD countries have reacted sharply to majoritarian bullying
at the U.N. Power, after all, has been defined as "participation in
decision-making," ' and the G-77 cannot be accused of maintaining
a low profile at international fora. Therefore, at least a prima facie
argument can be made that the South has accrued some power
relative to the North. What nonhistorical alarmists have failed to
take into account in their concern over the greatly increased
voting strength of the G-77 is that this putative power has been
extant for some twenty years without any drastic alterations in
the international system. In other words, from a parliamentary
perspective, the challenge is new neither in origin nor in ap-
praisal. This was evident as early as 1961:
It is simply not practical politics to suggest that the majority in
the United Nations can impose its will on any minority. The
Assembly is not the parliament of man; it does not pass legisla-
tion which becomes the law of nations. Essentially, it is a form of
diplomatic activity which seeks to mobilize the widest possible
support for recommendations as to how international affairs
should be conducted. The best resolutions are those which result
from close consultation involving all the main groups in the
Assembly. The least effective are those which are pressed to the
vote in the face of known and determined opposition. The
United Nations acts more effectively when it serves to bring
about an accommodation of the various national interests
through negotiation and agreement. It is not effective and may
not survive if any majority seeks to ride roughshod over minori-
ty opinion. 5
In contrast, Professor Rostow dignifies the U.N. with the
parliamentary analogy but introduces a critical qualification:
The main function Parliament served in the past, and that of the
United Nations today, is to develop and express a public opinion,
the ultimate source of governmental policy in a free society, and
the indispensable condition of public action. The crystallization
See, e.g., C. PAYER, THE DEBT TRAP: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE
THIRD WORLD (1974).
8 Much of this literature parodies Moynihan, The United State in Opposition, COMMEN-
TARY (March, 1974).
" H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 76 (1950).
,' Address by G.S. Murray, Carleton University, Ottawa (Jan. 7, 1961).
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of opinion-the expression of a collective will-remains among
the vital responsibilities of all parliaments, including those
which possess legislative power and other powers of govern-
ment. It is not a negligible public responsibility. But it should
not be confused with the power to govern.76
Indeed, if, as Woodrow Wilson reminded us, a parliament is
etymologically and unavoidably a "grand parley,"" then the U.N.
certainly fits the bill. However, Professor Rostow's caveat must
be underscored: the power to govern continues to devolve upon
the sovereign state, an entity mentioned in the U.N. Charter no
fewer than thirty-one times.
B. Aligning Expectations
A central task for diplomatists is to coordinate state expecta-
tions and to make U.N. conferences more predictable. Parliamen-
tary diplomacy must be shielded from excessive expectations. It is
not only idealistic but counter-productive to expect from it, and
from the institutions built under it, results which it cannot bring
about. International parliaments cannot abolish famine and con-
flict, inequity and revolution-just as municipal parliaments have
not succeeded in eliminating such domestic imperfections as crime
and social injustice. As noted earlier, parliamentary diplomacy
creates a framework for patient and constructive endeavors.
Perhaps one of the most taxing concerns of the international
community involves the transfer of resources from rich states to
poor states. Increasingly, the U.N. is developing into a global
welfare agency.7'8 Harlan Cleveland states:
The United Nations has staked out a clear jurisdiction in a few
important fields. The U.S. foreign aid program used to be the
biggest external contributor to the economic growth of less
developed lands; the U.N. system, including the World Bank, is
now far and away the largest contributor of grants and loans for
development.... The United Nations has also sponsored a series
of conferences which in the perspective of history may be seen
as historic. These great sensitivity training sessions, despite the
rhetoric of 'action programs,' are not really called to 'do'
, E. RoSTOw, LAW, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE 6 (1968).
7 Id.
7' For a discussion of the political nature of U.N. economic and social activities, see
Gordenker, The United Nations and Economic and Social Change, in THE UNITED NATIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (L. Gordenker ed. 1971).
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anything. They are designed to gather a large crowd from all
over, and raise the world's attention level for an important part
of the interdependent whole. .. 29
It is often difficult to specify a priori whether the costs of these
gatherings exceed the benefits. There may be overall net benefits
but dominant actors may receive a disproportionate share.
However, due to an idealistic conception of international con-
ferences, expectations often have been more sanguine than actual
performance seems to merit. Valuable human resources (especially
in the case of developing countries) can become tied up as a result of
the conference circuit. A display of verbal pyrotechnics can produce
diplomatic results but at an opportunity cost. Tangible political and
economic measures may be foregone once the symbolic show of
recognition is over. By the same token, in a survey of compliance
with and cooperation in making effective U.N. General Assembly
resolutions, Gabriella Rosner Lande concluded:
Contrary to the opinion of many, collective judgment does
seem to be a suitable mechanism for international problem-
solving. Since Member States in the United Nations system
represent both subject and organ, the cooperative process be-
tween the Organization and its Members is mutually dependent
and mutually reinforcing-that is, the character and action of
the U.N. surely bear a direct relation to cooperation among its
Members, but the Organization itself heightens their coopera-
tion in various ways and affects their behavior.
The attitudes and expectations of the majority of Members
seem to be an important dimension of this process. Significant,
too, appears to be the enumeration by the collective member-
ship of specific terms for resolving or moderating a
controversy."'
Although the policy implications of the commodity negotiations in
UNCTAD are extensive, few fora afford, for illustrative purposes,
a better apercu into the pitfalls of unaligned expectations.
The commitment to group unity and the group bargaining pro-
cess at UNCTAD" tends to compel an emphasis within the G-77
7 H. CLEVELAND, supra note 46, at 75-76.
o Lande, An Inquiry into the Successes and Failures of the United Nations General
Assembly, in THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 109 (L. Gordenker ed. 1971).
"1 For compelling prescriptive recommendations put forth to the second session of
UNCTAD in New Delhi, see Rostow, From Aid to Cooperation Development Strategy for
the Next Decade, 58 DEP'T STATE BULL. 359 (March 1968). For a history of UNCTAD, see R.
MEAGHER. AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER (1979). For recent
UNCTAD developments, see the 27th Report of the Commission to Study the Organization
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on grand principles in the dirigiste model, inflated expectations of
likely gains, a deliberate de-emphasis on exactly who gains what,
and a rigid negotiating stance. Individual demands simply are added
together; potential losers are pacified by tacit promises of com-
pensation. Only the emphasis on principles permits the creation of
a package that delays (not avoids) internal splits. Devising the
package is time consuming and tends to preoccupy the leadership
so that concern for proposals reflecting mutual interests across
the G-77 is secondary. Even so, internal tension is always present.
However, the tension is moderated or finessed by peer pressure
within an increasingly institutionalized political process and by
de-emphasizing a concern with impact and details. Additionally,
the offers by the OECD countries have not been generous and
have tended to promise most benefits over the mid or long term.
Thus, the promise of significant short-range benefits in the
UNCTAD package is very attractive and, in any case, the limited
nature of OECD proposals is insufficient to overcome the strong
commitment to unity. Losing face and standing within the G-77
outweighs the promise of potential long-run gain.
Two aspects of the intellectual environment should be reas-
sessed. First, stable solutions to North-South problems are unlikely
as long as the choice is between one side's efficient solutions,
which promise primarily long-term benefits to the developing
countries, and the other side's equitable solutions, which require
extensive, immediate, and persistent change. Is some kind of
agreement to bypass this conflict feasible and, if not, how should
one bargain in the existing circumstances? Second, conceptual and
doctrinal uncertainty about what can or ought to be done, and by
what means, may generate a bias for very narrow and technical
solutions and against experimentation or innovation in a context
where the latter may be justified. At any rate, increased con-
sciousness of these issues may be useful in and of itself.
C. Moving from Confrontation to Consensus Politics
A fundamental misconception that has caused some observers
to refuse to face the complexities that inhere in the formation of
constitutive prescription is the conviction that the "passive vir-
tues"82 obtain in attempts to revamp U.N. procedures. However,
of Peace (L. Sohn, chairman): Restructuring the United Nations System for Economic and
Social Cooperation and Development (July, 1980).
"1 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 113-98 (1962).
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as Professor Rostow has observed, formal voting is not the only
modality by which people express their views in municipal
orders." Similarly, the vote in international fora is not an end but
one of several means. In deep appreciation of the pervasive impor-
tance of customary law in any community, Ulpian long ago
remarked: "After all, what is the difference whether the people
makes known its will by a vote, or by things themselves and by
acts.""
It may be that irreconcilable differences have developed be-
tween states within and without the U.N., that the institution has
begun to lose its function as "a center for harmonizing the actions
of nations in the attainment of (these) common ends.""5 Yet, the ex-
tent to which a government will propose or support action at a
U.N. conference turns on the confidence it has in the mechanics of
parliamentary diplomacy; more confidence results in a greater
willingness to participate." By the same token, many states have
little alternative to the U.N. system.87 Even when parliamentary
3 E. ROSTOW, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAW
XIX (1962).
" Ulpian, Digest I, 3.32, quoted in C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND
MODERN 64 (rev. ed. 1947).
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 4.
" The 18th century writer Francois de Callieres, in his De la maniere de negocier avec
les Souverains (1716) observed that open dealing is the basis of confidence and that sound
diplomacy was to be based on the creation of confidence. The following categories of con-
fidence are likely to affect the conduct of conference diplomacy:
(a) Confidence of delegations in each other. The degree to which such confidence
exists is influenced by the state of relations between the governments of these
delegations and by the personal contact between heads (and members) of delega-
tions. For example, two governments may be on bad terms, may perhaps have
broken off diplomatic relations; yet if the heads of their delegations to a con-
ference happen to have known each other for years, a certain amount of con-
fidence and trust may come to exist at that particular conference between the
two delegations.
(b) Confidence in the presiding officer. If the chairman is trusted, his decisions
will be respected more easily than if he is distrusted.
(c) Confidence in the secretariat. If certain delegations do not have confidence in
the secretariat, believing, for example, that it systematically tries to favor certain
other delegations, latent or open disagreement between delegations will be
fostered. Reports or other documents emanating from a secretariat, which is not
wholly trusted by certain delegations, are scrutinized much more critically and at
greater length. On the other hand, a secretariat that has the full confidence of all
delegations can have considerable influence toward cooperative action of the con-
ference.
Although the United Nations is only one of a number of international political systems,
it enjoys the distinction of being the only system able to claim near-universal membership.
States, in their peculiarly self-regarding calculuses, have, almost without exception,
thought that the benefits of participating in the U.N. system outweigh the disadvantages.
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diplomacy seems bogged in its own inertia, it functions as a device
for finding time so that reason can prevail." In this context
parliamentary diplomacy becomes "preventive diplomacy,"
alleviating the intensity of revisionist pressure by acting as a safe-
ty valve for change." Hence, even those most conscious of its
defects are prepared to regard the U.N. as a necessity, faute de
mieux.
If a transition is to be effectuated from confrontation politics to
consensus politics, parliamentary procedures must be overhauled.
The aim should not be procedural hypertechnicality. Rather modi
operandi should be devised to permit more constructiye treatment
of pressing substantive issues. Confrontation politics can be an ef-
fective way of dealing with a decentralized system, where the
desired outcomes cannot be obtained without the establishment of
complex new relationships. As the midwife of change, confronta-
tion can force these complex relations to emerge by delivering
action-forcing events. However, crises precipitated by confronta-
tion do not guarantee relief. The attention they arouse can be
amortized only by setting in place the necessary channels for con-
structive and sustained action.9"
1. Concentrating Parliamentary Diplomacy
Students of sectoral problems requiring international coopera-
tion conclude, for instance, that coordination and management of
trade, monetary, and investment practices require a "core group
working in very close cooperation among the major industrial
countries."91 Such a grouping already exists in the International
Indeed, there is no evidence of a state attempting to establish an alternative and com-
petitive system. In thirty-five years, only Indonesia voluntarily withdrew, to announce its
resumed participation in less than a year. See Comment, Legal Aspects of Indonesia's
"Withdrawal" from the United Nations, 6 HARV. INT'L L. J. 172 (1965).
" In the words of Dag Hammarskjold, "[c]onflicts, not only in human life, but also in the
life of nations, are often never resolved, but simply outgrown." "The New Santa Maria," ad-
dress to the American Association for the United Nations, Sept. 14, 1953.
Daniel P. Moynihan has observed that the U.N. system is a
system which strives for stability. If few or any nations look to the provisions of
the Charter to prevent war or aggression, nonetheless most do look to the pre-
sent United Nations arrangements to mitigate, mollify and muffle these tenden-
cies as they appear among all but the greatest powers, for which an exception is
made.
Moynihan, Abiotrophy in Turtle Bay: the United Nations in 1975, 17 HARV. INT'L L. J. 465,
471 (1976).
See generally D. MOYNIHAN, A DANGEROUS PLACE 106-07 (1978).
01 Finger, quoting several other experts, in United States Policy Toward International
Institutions, 48 INT'L ORGANIZATION 352 (1976).
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Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlement, and work-
ing parties of the OECD.
Some issues, such as resource scarcity, can be negotiated effec-
tively only between the contending interests. But there is not
always a need for "committees of the whole." One model of a
limited membership forum is the Paris-based Conference on Inter-
national Economic Cooperation (CIEC). CIEC, which originated for
pragmatic reasons during the early period of the oil price crisis
but expanded to cover related economic and resource topics,
decided to operate on the principle of what might loosely be called
"representative" rather than "direct" democracy, with twenty-
seven nations, reflecting all major worldwide interests other than
those of the Warsaw Pact, negotiating on behalf of approximately
100 nations.
Where the primary aim is to air grievances and exchange
views, or to design and launch needed initiatives and programs,
the General Assembly and U.N. mega-conferences provide the ap-
propriate fora. But where action on economic, financial, or
technical policy is required, smaller groups usually will be more
effective. The aim is to overcome the linear obstacle of 144 states
trying to address themselves to everything in one forum, with the
demonstrably undesirable combination of inter-issue bargaining
and the temptation to engage in harmful propaganda.
2. Watering Down the Vote
Because voting is so conspicuous, conference diplomacy is
sometimes condemned as an inferior technique of decisionmaking
whereby rampant majorities, using the "voting machine," push
through the resolutions they insist upon seeing adopted. This
view neglects the fact that in practice a great many decisions are
arrived at without any voting, through a process of consensus.
A.J.P. Tammes has observed:
Unanimity is reached by making the retreat for dissenting
delegations easier. They are permitted to have their objections
fully recorded in the minutes. They are exempted from the rigid
alternative of either subscribing to what is hardly acceptable to
them, or defeating what may present itself as the hope of Man-
kind. It will not be considered irregular, therefore, if they ab-
stain from the vote. Abstentions not being counted in ascertain-
ing whether there is common acquiescence, the principle of
unanimity is outwardly saved, but under that veil, as was the
case in medieval communities, majority decision is virtually in-
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troduced.... When something substantial has emerged from the
early discussions, when amendments have been added and com-
promises inserted in order to meet the opposition, the final prod-
uct is the work of the whole, rather than of the majority, and
minorities may find it more and more difficult completely to
deny or reject that product when, in the course of the successive
legislative stages, it gains in weight and approval. The argu-
ment will be used that you cannot permit the result of long
preparations, of laborious discussions and of happily reached
compromises to be entirely lost in sight of the harbour."
Although numerical majorities in organs without weighted
voting may breed as many disadvantages as the paralyzing vetoes
of the Security Council, it should be acknowledged that the con-
cept of one state-one vote is a principle firmly enshrined in the
United Nations. No scheme for formal weighting of votes in the
General Assembly or at U.N. conferences has any chance of suc-
cess. 3 Even if a majority favored it-which it does not-it would
require a Charter change and thus be subject to the veto. But a
larger issue is at stake than voting. The very notion of "voting by
the numbers" is conceptually dubious in organs such as the
General Assembly, in which contending factions and forces come
together to exchange positions and try, in other words of the
Charter, to harmonize the actions of states in seeking to achieve
their common ends. Thus, it is desirable to de-emphasize the
voting process as an invariable way of making decisions. The con-
sensus process can handily and constructively supplant formal
votes for recording the sentiments of states." This approach has
" A. Tammes, Decisions of International Organs as a Source of International Law, 94
RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague Academy of International Law 261, 287) (11-1958).
"3 In effect, weighted voting applies today in the United Nations Security Council. Its ex-
istence in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund is a powerful stimulus toward
consensus and effective action. It exists also in a sense in the International Energy Agency,
various commodity organizations, and in the new International Fund for Agricultural
Development. The kinds of programs in which some form of weighted decisionmaking will
be highly desirable are, to give several examples, those involving allocation of food or use of
commodity buffer stocks, appropriation of capital funds, and decisions in any new interna-
tional seabed authority that involve access to mining sites or allocation of resources.
The process could take various forms. One proposed by several scholars is dual vote: first
a vote by country, then by a weighting formula. Or it could take place on a bicameral basis,
as in the U.S. Congress, where the two houses vote separately (the equivalents of the two
houses would perhaps be the plenary body-the assembly-and a "council" of more limited
and representational membership).
" Adoption of a resolution by consensus does not imply that all members present in the
U.N. body fully or unanimously support the entire contents, but rather that no one opposes
the contents strongly enough to insist upon the right to vote against the text.
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proven partially successful in several organizations, such as the
U.N. Outer Space Committee, UNCTAD, and the International
Energy Agency, where formal voting is kept to a minimum. Con-
sensus, of course, implies a meaningful compromise and not a
mere papering-over of differences; an easier task when postures
do not have to be struck and positions polarized and then frozen in
formal votes.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the interactive theory, the U.N. and its fora are designed to
create and then to cope with conflict. Conflict is employed
positively rather than suppressed as in the dirigiste model. "A
clash of doctrines is not a disaster-it is an opportunity."9 Public
decisions are made in a process of conflict resolution in which
states attempt to influence each others' behavior through bargain-
ing, negotiation, adaptive adjustments, coalition building, and con-
flict displacement. Conflict is harnessed to bring scrutiny to bear
on possibly mistaken institutions and policies." It is also exploited
to stimulate an always inadequate supply and quality of analysis.
Where conflict leads not to mere compromise but to a reconsidera-
tion of differences and a new "integration," it is especially valued.
In contrast, the G-77, acting in the dirigiste model, has come to
view interaction and protected procedures as peripheral. This at-
titude threatens to condemn the U.N. to the periphery of interna-
tional life.
Whether the U.N. becomes an inclusive framework capable of
sustaining a revisionist bias depends on the way its member
governments make decisions together. The parliamentary
diplomacy system is, perhaps, the dominant process of
multilateral contract formation. Because of its essentially political
character, the system suffers from a dichotomy. On the one hand,
the relationship between law and politics is perceived by the
politican as a compound in which the law loses its properties to
" A. WHITEHEAD. SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 186 (1928).
" Judge Learned Hand observed that "right conclusions are more likely to be gathered
out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many
this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all." United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y., 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Courts,
which might be designed as research institutions for disposing of cases before them, are not
so designed. Instead, conflict is stimulated through an adversary system. The assumption is
that the conflict will bring out the facts more fully. On larger questions of public policy,




political expediency. The jurist, on the other hand, perceives a
mixture and concerns himself primarily with distilling the legal
element. Consequently, the politician frequently sloughs over
Philip Jessup's proposition that "international law is involved in a
diplomatic dialectical usage in the everyday conduct of interna-
tional affairs."97 By the same token, the jurist is more likely than
not to ignore Dag Hammarskjold's admonishment that interna-
tional law should be viewed "not merely as a technical set of rules
and procedures, but as the authoritative expression of principles
that determine the goals and direction of collective action."98 The
evidence suggests that international law and geopolitics are not
necessarily inimical. It can be argued that a more creative integra-
tion of adjective law with constitutive law is a prerequisite for in-
ternational harmony."
There remains the question of whether the parliamentary
diplomacy system is viable in a world increasingly pressed by the
scarcity salient. From one side it is argued that the system does
not ensure sufficient stability-that it accentuates divisiveness,
provides a cover for violence, and leads to the collapse of law,
order, and authority. In the alternative, it is charged that the
system does not permit a significant change-that it never really
allows radicial expression, that it is loaded in favor of the status
quo, and that it merely diverts public attention from the need for
action. Others have urged that the system is based on outdated
theories of pluralism and can never provide the moral or organiz-
ing force necessary to give meaning to world order values.
No one can deny the force of these various objections. The orbit
on which the U.N. was launched after the Second World War is
decaying. At the rate that the U.N. is presently losing the
characteristics of a stable political system, it may soon lapse into
' Quoted in Oliver, Relation of International Law to International Relations, 48 AM.
SOC'Y INTL L. PRoc. 108 (1954).
" Schachter, Dag Hammarskjold on Law and Politics, 56 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. PROc. 6
(1962).
" Professor Rostow eloquently expresses this relationship:
By definition, the idea of peace is linked to the idea of law. Arbitrary power
may maintain order in society for a time without the regularities of law, but peace
is beyond its reach. While the concept of law pervades the social process too com-
pletely to be held for long by a single definition, in its simplest sense law is a
system of peace -a peaceful way to resolve social conflicts and make social policy
through known procedures and in accordance with known and accepted prin-
ciples-an alternative both to tyranny and to anarchy. Thus every system of law
is a reticulated body of custom and of ideas-a pattern of social behavior on the
one hand, and of rules to guide and direct behavior on the other.
E. ROSTOW, PEACE IN THE BALANCE 283 (1972).
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irrelevance. Still, the question remains an open one."® Certainly,
the parliamentary diplomacy system cannot by itself provide
stability in a world of change. 1° Only if the economic, social, and
political arrangements of the global community provide a suffi-
cient degree of consensus can one expect the system to survive.
Nor can it be said that the system by itself will lead to rapid
change or to change in the right direction. Not only has the reality
never conformed to the model, but also the system itself is merely
an instrument for effecting change, not a guarantee of success.
1 United Nations fora can "legitimize" peace and arms control treaties, and initiate pro-
grams on practical matters. They have played a highly constructive role in launching impor-
tant programs in fields where interdependence requires cooperation. Recent examples are
the establishment of the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control; the adoption of a world plan of
action leading to the U.N. Fund for Population; creation of the U.N. Environment Program;
the convening of the successful World Food Conference; and guidance and support of the
U.N. Disaster Relief Office.
Hammarskjold's paradox comes to mind:
One of the many contradictions of life is the frequency with which we refer to
ourselves as living in a period of change and rapid development, while, on the
other hand, we are so often reluctant to acknowledge the need for adjustment in
our ways to the changes which actually take place.
Address by Dag Hammarskjold to the Foreign Policy Association (New York, Oct. 21, 1953),
reprinted in DAG HAMMARSKJOLD: SERVANT OF PEACE 49 (W. Foote ed. 1962).
